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ABSTRACT 
Many industry standards and methodologies were 
introduced which has brought forth the management of 
threats assessment and risk management of information 
assets in a systematic manner. This paper will review and 
analyze the main processes followed in IT risk management 
frameworks from the perspective of the threat analysis 
process using a threat modeling methodology. In this study, 
the authors propose a new assessment model which shows 
that systematic threat analysis is an essential element to be 
considered as an integrated process within IT risk 
management frameworks. The new proposed model 
complements and fulfills the gap in the practice of assessing 
information security risks. 
 
Keywords—Risk Assessment, Security Assessment Framework, 
Threat Analysis, Risk Management.  
1. INTRODUCTION  
The ever-changing cyber activities evolved in a manner 
that circumvents the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of control boundaries that are built in 
technologies. This raised the risk of unauthorized access, 
data manipulation and disruption of business information 
which has a severe business impact on organizations [1]. It is 
clear that cyber attackers are managing to stay ahead of 
protection means which has elevated the concern for 
safeguarding valuable information asset. For that reason, the 
protection of information has become an important endeavor 
for the top management of many organizations to gain 
appropriate assurances and operational visibility on the 
protection of resources and information. One of the steps in 
risk management frameworks, especially in the area of 
information security, is threat identification which is an 
essential element that contributes to the analysis of a risk to 
information Asset [2][3]. The process of threat identification 
and analysis against information asset provide a direction for 
carrying out an accurate risk assessment and implement 
appropriate countermeasures to mitigate the risks on 
resources and information. The nature of threat identification 
and analysis is complex and many standalone methods were 
introduced to provide guidance for addressing threats 
proactively. The scope of the methodologies of threat 
analysis is expanded and discussed in detail as part of the 
process of application development life cycle using threat 
 
 
modeling techniques [4]. However, this capability does not 
extend to the ongoing risk management practices in order to 
identify, analyze and evaluate threats appropriately. This 
limitation introduces a gap in the risk assessment and the 
precision of risk treatment planning in order to implement the 
relevant countermeasures that counteracts the identified risks.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II 
provides the problem statement. The standards, guides and 
methodologies are briefly surveyed in Section III. Section IV 
discusses the gap and findings in relation to the reviewed 
papers. The gap is complemented by proposing a hybrid 
model for information security risk assessment in section V. 
The proposed model is compared with the reviewed 
standards, guides and methodologies in section VI, which 
focuses on the threat analysis component. The case study in 
section VII shows a typical implementation of risk 
management and the missing gap in the threat analysis 
process due to the disconnection between risk management 
and threat modeling methodologies. The conclusion of future 
work is offered in section IX.  
2. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
One of the key processes in risk assessment is threat 
identification and analysis. In this research, we will attempt 
to answer the following questions  
 To what extent do the processes of threat modeling 
affect the existing risk management framework 
practices?
 Will the adoption of threat modeling processes, as 
an integrated process of risk management, improve 
the risk identification and mitigation process?

3. III.  BACKGROUND & RELATED WORK 

A. Risk Management  
The risk management frameworks outlined in this section  
of the research consist of management abstract layer 
approach to risk assessment. There are different approaches 
to each framework and for that reason a brief overview is 
given to each. 
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 ISO/IEC 27005 provides a standardized approach for 
information security risk management within an 
organization and it is a key requirement in information 
security management system (ISMS) [3]. The standard is 
applicable to organizations of all types given the generic 
outline of process flow for managing risks.
 NIST SP 800-37 is a guide that is made for the purpose 
of assisting federal information system and organizations 
in following a systematic approach of identifying, and 
evaluating risks to information systems [2]. The guide 
advocates that the risk assessment process is part of a 
larger risk management hierarchy within the 
organization. This resembles ISO/IEC 27005 in terms of 
making the entire cycle of information security risk 
management part of and an integrated process within the 
organization that is driven by a top down approach.
 The Risk Analysis and Management Method (CRAMM) 
provided government departments with a methodology 
for managing information security risks through a 
systematic review. The method has undergone multiple 
revisions and was adopted by Insight Consulting [5]. It 
was commercialized and made available to other 
organizations that are keen on implementing the 
CRAMM methodology.
 ISRAM method uses quantitative methods to risk 
assessment through mathematical calculation using a 
typical probability and impact equation based approach 
to deduce the severity of identified risk [6].
 
B.  Threat Modeling  
The threat modeling framework and methodologies are 
typically addressed at the operational level within the 
organization. The outcome of most methodologies is to 
technically assess the security issues using systematic 
methods which are not all identical. As a result, a brief 
overview is given to each. 
 
 OCTAVE framework is designed to assist organizations 
in understanding the cyber threats targeting their asset 
and follow a systematic approach in addressing the 
associated risks. Currently, there are two approaches to 
OCTAVE. The first approach is designed for large 
organizations. The second approach is the simplified 
version for small organizations. The OCTAVE Allegro 
framework is the successor of the original OCTAVE 
method follows a multiple phase approach with multiple 
interrelated processes and sub activities [7].
 OWASP threat modeling is driven by the objective of 
embedding application security principles during the 
application development life cycle in order to ensure 
proper implementation of controls before the formal 
usage of the application and its resources. This results in 
avoiding cyber risks at the early stages of the application 
development which minimizes drastic changes to the 
application development at a later stage [4].
 PASTA is an application threat modeling process guide 
that follows a sequential approach to identify and analyze 
threats. This methodology uses a seven step approach to 
risk assessment and leverages an attacker’s point of view 
on application technologies. This model is driven by
business alignment at the early stages of the process to 
establish appropriate requirements that impacts the 
outcome of the decision making process [8].  
 CORAS is a method for conducting risk analysis that uses 
unified modeling language (UML) in order to achieve a 
practical approach of model-based risk assessment. There 
are eight critical steps taken to complete the assessment in 
order to fulfill all the core elements of this method [9]. 
CORAS provides a way to demonstrate the cascading effect 
of a single vulnerability resulting to an incident.
 
4. RESEARCH GAP AND FINDINGS 
 
The observed information security risk management 
practices are designed using a management perspective 
through an abstract layer that follows a structured process 
for assessing risks. One of the main interrelated processes is 
threat identification and analysis, which is not 
comprehensive in a manner that captures a systematic review 
and evaluation of threats. This limitation creates weakness in 
the risk assessment cycle, which impacts the decision 
making process. The decision making process impacts the 
implementation of the appropriate countermeasure and the 
resource required to protect the asset. On the other hand, the 
threat identification and analysis are expanded in threat 
modeling methodologies and frameworks which are 
designed to follow a technical process to risk assessment. 
This operational aspect of threat modeling shows that threat 
identification, analysis and evaluation is carried out in a 
systematic and structured manner that is comprehensive for 
managing technical risk. It is important to note that the 
operational process in the reviewed threat assessment cycle 
does not possess the risk management views for managing 
technical security risks.  
Even though both practices differ from one approach to 
another, overlap and similarities exist among the processes. 
However, the common goal shared among the practices is 
the adequate protection of assets. The integration of threat 
modeling processes into risk management framework 
ensures that technical security risks are managed in a manner 
that aligns with the organization’s practices and transferable 
to decision makers. Subsequently, improving the overall risk 
mitigation strategies and minimizes the disconnection 
between both practices and streamline the risk assessment 
process. 
 
5. PROPOSED SOLUTION  
The following proposed hybrid model shows the critical 
processes to information security risk assessment. The critical 
processes are linked based on the fundamental relationship 
between the definition of asset, vulnerability, threat and 
countermeasures to identify information security risks. The 
relationship model demonstrates the sequence of processes of a 
core risk identification, evaluation and remediation function at a 
conceptual level. The sequence of the relationship between the 
definitions is based on the Factor Analysis for Information Risk 
model [10]. The proposed hybrid model applies to information 
security at an abstract and the operational layer that fulfills the 
disconnection gap between management and technical approach 
to risk assessment due to the adoption of selected threat 
modeling processes for threat 
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analysis. The following Figure 1 shows the proposed hybrid 
model which consists of a core principle to risk assessment. 
 
It is important to note that the activities are formatted in a 
conceptual which serves as a guide that constitutes the entire 
process cycle. The development of a methodology is subject 
to further customizations depending on the nature and the 
requirement of the organization adopting the model.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Proposed Hybrid Risk Assessment Model 
 
A.  Business Alignment  
This stage has four activities which consist of the 
development of information security risk management and 
information classification policy, scope of risk assessment and 
protection measures, monitoring and communication strategy. 
The activities at this stage sets the expectation tone and the 
objective of risk assessment that aligns with the business 
objectives. The policy outlines the guiding principles and 
responsibility necessary to protect the information assets and 
the required measurement. The information classification policy 
sets the principles of the importance of restricted, confidential, 
internal information. This determination aids in the 
identification of the importance of the asset during the risk 
treatment stage. The scope and boundaries of the assessment 
determine the business functions that rely on the electronic 
services that are subject to the implementation of the policy. 
This determination guides the execution of the risk assessment 
during the execution cycle. Finally, the communication and 
monitoring strategy shows the collaboration of risk 
communication and the relationship with the stakeholders 
during and after the change of risk status. Typically, this takes 
place at the monitoring phase where the change in the 
environment or conditions elevates or reduces the severity of 
the security risks. The change of risk severity initiates the 
mitigation strategy and the subsequent management processes 
for the risk treatment and the associated decisions in order to 
reduce the severity of the risk to acceptable levels. This entire 
state considers the planning and context establishment of the 
risk management within the organization that aligns with the 
direction of business strategy. Therefore, business alignment is 
a key factor during the planning and establishment of 
information security risk assessment [11]. 
 
B.  Asset Profiling  
There are three main core activities to be implemented at 
this stage. First, the identification of the asset in the scope. 
The level of the asset identification is a service driven 
identification approach which is the collection of resources 
that provide a specific service to stakeholders. Second, the 
service ownership and the classification. The identification 
of the service owner followed by the classification of the 
services in terms of sensitivity. Finally, the identification and 
classification of the service lead to the decomposition process to 
identify the components that comprise each service such as 
software, information, platform, hardware. The depth of the 
decomposition depends on the service identification process. 
This process is subject to further customizations that aligns in a 
manner that fit the organization in question. This decomposition 
process leads to the identification of a specific weakness in the 
service. Therefore, the decomposition of the service determines 
the exact components that are subject to further vulnerability 
discovery process which subsequently leads to the applicable 
mitigation strategies. The asset profiling provide the decision 
makers with the depth of understanding the importance of the 
asset and the impact it has on critical functions [12]. 
 
C.  Vulnerability Discovery  
The the vulnerability discovery process takes presence to 
highlight the weaknesses in the component. In most cases, 
this is achieved through automated a query tool with built-in 
capabilities to understand the weaknesses in component or 
manual processes to uncover the weaknesses. However, it is 
important to note that query tools generate false positives 
that does not relate to the component or situation. In 
addition, many of the query tools do not consider the context 
of existing countermeasures in the setup of the network and 
infrastructure [13]. Therefore, the list of vulnerabilities 
generated by the query tool is subject to the mitigation 
strategies of existing control in the network. Finally, the 
alignment of a threat with a vulnerability generates a valid 
risk context that is subject to further analysis. This alignment 
determines the vulnerability with the matching threat to 
establish the context of exploitation. The presence of a 
vulnerability without a threat does not always lead to an 
exploitation process and therefore lacks the fundamental 
elements of risk identification. 
 
D. Threat Analysis  
The threat analysis stage consists of the development of a 
threat profile. The threat profile consists of the identification of 
a threat agent (actor), the discovered vulnerability and the threat 
scenario after matching the threat actor with the discovered 
vulnerability. The source of the threat actor comes from two 
main streams which are internal or external. The alignment of 
the threat actor with the discovered vulnerability builds the 
threat scenario that leads to the exploitation of the weakness in 
the component. The establishment of a threat scenario is 
necessary in order to build a threat tree. The threat tree will 
identify the channel and the method used to exploit the 
component to achieve the threat scenario. The development of a 
treat tree can follow either OWASP or AND/OR method that 
was developed by Bruce Schneier’s 
[14]. The establishment of a threat tree shows the possible 
entry points to achieve the threat scenario. The development 
of an attack tree on each scenario builds the intelligence 
required in order to establish an awareness for the risk 
construction stage and replicate the same threat scenario on 
other components that have similar attribute and conditions 
within the same scope. 
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E.  Risk Calculation  
There are two types of risk assessment methods which 
are qualitative and quantitative [15][16]. The qualitative risk 
assessment method describes the magnitude of a threat 
impact to the organization and the probability of risk 
occurrence which is expressed using a multiplication 
function. This description of probability and impact is 
typically rated using labels such as high, medium or low. 
Some of the discussed frameworks leverage numerical 
values to present the final risk rating after determining the 
rating of impact and probability. For instance, 3 signifies 
high, 2 is medium and 1 is low. The mathematical formula 
for calculating the final risk varies from one methodology to 
another. The following is an example of risk calculation 
based on a qualitative [17]. 
 
Risk Value = Impact * Probability. 
 
In a typical scenario where a moderate probability of 
unauthorized access to the password file results in a high 
impact, produce an overall risk value of 6. 
 
Risk Value = Impact (3) * Probability (2). 
 
However, the overall risk value of 6 does not indicate any 
importance without applying the final value to a risk grid to 
indicate the rating of the overall risk. Another method for 
obtaining the overall risk value is through a discussion based 
assessment where the assembled analysis team determines 
the overall risk value using judgement based assessment 
depending on the context of the risk. On the other hand, 
quantitative risk assessment method measures the risk based 
on monetary value. This is measured based on annual loss 
expectancy (ALE) which is calculated based on a single loss 
expectancy (SLE) multiplied by the annual rate of 
occurrence (ARO) [17]. 
 
ALE = SLE * ARO. 
 
While both qualitative and quantitative methods are valid, a 
mature practice usually adopts one of the methods to 
regulate the risk assessment practice and ensure consistency 
and systematic assessment. It provides a clarity that is 
meaningful to decision makers to investigate the possible 
existing controls that mitigates the attack tree branches 
which is discussed in the next stage. 
 
F.  Control Gap Analysis  
There are three main core activities in the control 
analysis stage. First, the review of existing countermeasures 
in place that mitigates the identified risks in the risk 
calculation stage. Upon the identification of existing 
controls, a measurement for analyzing the adequacy to 
mitigate the identified risk is required in order to ensure the 
acceptability of the residual risk. This is achieved using the 
following equation at a conceptual level [3][18]. 
 
Outstanding Risk = Identified Risk – Existing Controls. 
 
This formula determines whether the existing countermeasure is 
sufficient in a manner that makes the outstanding risk 
acceptable. The acceptability of the outstanding risk is 
determined by the risk severity value scale discussed in the risk 
calculation stage. On the other hand, if the outstanding risk is 
not acceptable, a determination for the expected controls is 
required in order to achieve the acceptable level. 
 
This second activity for determining the expected controls is 
measured using the following at a conceptual level [3][18] 
 
Acceptable Risk = Expected Control Behavior + 
Existing Controls Behavior. 
 
The expected behavior is measured by a satisfactory 
appraisal of the risk after the implementation of the expected 
control in addition to the existing control. The expected 
control behavior is determined using a specific approach 
based on a strategic sequence to control implementation such 
as preventive, detective, corrective and finally compensating 
control. This sequence shows the priority of control selection 
to address the outstanding risk to ensure its reduction to 
acceptable levels. For example, a web application server that 
is vulnerable to SQL injection attacks is mitigated using a 
preventive control such as the implementation of input 
validation techniques [19]. However, it is important to note 
that the selection of the applicable controls reduces the 
identified risk to acceptable levels. Finally, the third activity 
is the gap in the existing countermeasure to address, the 
calculated risk that is deemed unacceptable. This gap is 
measured using the following formula at a conceptual level 
[3][18] 
 
Control Gap analysis = Expected Control – 
Existing Controls. 
 
The gap identified is the difference between the expected 
and existing controls. This gap leads to the risk treatment to 
mitigate the outstanding risk and the associated expected 
control selection activities. 
 
G. Risk Treatment  
The gap in the controls for the outstanding unacceptable 
risks identified requires a risk treatment plan. This makes the 
risk treatment stage subject to two main activities. First, the 
detailed planning of the expected control behavior using a 
standard or documented best practice index. This elevates 
the expected control behavior in a manner that is optimal and 
achieves the highest maturity. Second, the study of the 
expected control behavior through cost/benefit analysis [20]. 
The cost/benefit analysis, reviews the expected control 
behavior from financial, operational and legal feasibility. 
The operational feasibility reviews the after-implementation 
aspect of control, maintenance and the existing capability to 
ensure the expected control behavior. Finally, the legal 
feasibility is the review of the legal aspect of control 
acquisition, implementation and consequence. The three 
dimensions of cost/benefit analysis leads to the development 
of a structured plan in a manner that is meaningful to the 
decision makers. The final structured plan is documented 
and reviewed with the business process owners and service 
custodians. The implementation of the new controls depends 
on the capability of the organization. Alternatively, the 
absence of the capability within the organization leads to the 
acquisition of the expected control behavior. This activity 
solely depends on the communication strategies of 
identifying risks with the senior management of the 
organization. Typically, the resource of financial support is a 
key element to ensure the involvement of the relevant 
stakeholders. Therefore, it is important that the risk 
management language becomes the appropriate channel for 
elevating the outstanding risks and the associated risk 
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treatment plans to obtain the consent of the decision makers 
on the suitable mitigation strategies. Thus, this stage 
connects the former activities with the risk management and 
information classification policy which is the first stage 
identified at the beginning of the proposed hybrid model. 
function in the organization. The proposed model shows that 
threat analysis leverages some of the key processes followed 
in threat modeling methodologies while maintaining the 
principles of risk management in order to complement and 
provide an overall approach to risk assessment. 
 
6. COMPARISON OF THREAT ANALYSIS 
PROCESS  
The context focuses on a threat agent taking advantage of a 
vulnerability residing in an asset that causes the exploitation 
process to occur [21]. This context establishment brings forth 
the improvement to the accuracy in identifying the relevant 
risks in the assessment process. The identification of a threat 
builds upon the source for deriving threat agents. The 
identification of threat agents takes on many forms such as 
Malware, insider threat or an external attacker. The threat agent 
in relation to the vulnerability discovered provides the 
opportunity to compromise the asset [17]. This logical 
relationship between the threat, vulnerability and asset pave the 
opportunity to assess the context as a result of the review of the 
conditions occurring. The occurrence of the condition confirms 
the potential of exploitation process. ISO/IEC 27005, NIST 
800-35 and CRAMM provide a predefined list of threats that 
can be leveraged during the threat identification process in the 
risk assessment cycle. This predefined list of threats provides 
the direction for the establishment of a context which is 
obtained using a collaborative process through an interview or 
feedback mechanism. This discussion based approach using a 
predefined list has many advantages. First, it provides the 
stakeholders and the decision makers with the ability to review 
a larger scale of possible threats that targets the asset in 
question. Second, it provides a venue for raising the awareness 
to the decision makers on the possible danger that targets the 
asset. One of the disadvantages of using a predefined threat list 
is the endless possibilities of establishing risk context which 
raises the challenge in narrow the most important 
countermeasure. In addition, the identified possibilities do not 
always align with the vulnerabilities identified which impacts 
the establishment of a context. FRAP follows a meeting based 
discussion with the relevant business process owners and key 
stakeholders to identify the threat and establish the relevant 
context. This collaborative based approach to identify threat is 
not systematic and does not follow a proved methodology 
compared in OCTAVE, PASTA, OWASP and Microsoft. The 
latter methodologies identify threats using the STRIDE model 
to obtain the source required to establish the risk context. The 
actual establishment of the context is performed using threat 
tree and abuse case scenarios to provide granularity and 
precision to considering practical situations. Even though the 
methodologies do not all use the exact steps, the principles of in 
depth analysis of the threat scenarios are followed. One 
drawback to this approach is the lack of the involvement of 
business process owners, which increases the challenge to 
obtain the resources to mitigate the identified risks. Finally, the 
CORAS risk modeling approach identifies risks context using a 
modeling methodology involving the business process owner 
through a structured brainstorming sessions. This approach uses 
the business process flow as a model in order to establish threat 
scenarios that align with the model in question and to protect 
the targeted asset, but not the business process that operates the 
mission critical 
 
7. CASE STUDY  
The case study reviews the information that represents the 
processes followed through the results of the collection and 
analysis of the artifacts that are implemented. The artifacts 
reviewed present the opportunity to demonstrate a typical 
implementation of risk assessment to confirm the presence 
of a structured process. In turn, provides a comparison to 
with the proposed hybrid model to establish weaknesses that 
are subject to further improvement. 
 
A.  Information Security Policy  
The reviewed standards, guides and methodologies this 
paper advocate the importance of information security policy 
as a top down approach for the implementation of risk 
management to mitigate risks on information assets. The 
artifact reviewed is the Information Security Policy Manual 
that is endorsed by the senior management of the institution. 
This policy manual contains a high level statement of 
management directives to reflect on the intention of 
protecting the institution’s asset. The policy manual dictates 
the development of Information Security Framework 
Standards. The standard reviewed shows the key processes 
in specific control domains such as physical security, access 
controls, network security and others. In addition, one of the 
statements reviewed in the standard references the use of 
ITM Risk Management Framework Standard which states 
the following: “Information security risks will be identified 
and managed in conformance with the scope standard 
requirements set out in the ITM Risk Management 
Framework Standard” 
 
As a result, the ITM Risk Management Framework Standard is 
reviewed and shows the implementation of a risk management 
methodology. The methodology implementation is reflected in 
the IT risk register based on the following statement available in 
the ITM Risk Management Framework Standard which states 
the following: "IT risk will be documented in an ITS Risk 
Register" 
 
This artifact is assessed in the risk assessment 
documentation stage. However, the entire sequence of the 
policy establishment in the institution in question shows a 
comprehensive deployment of information security policies. 
This is an essential stage that directs subsequent 
implementations that aligns with the directives of the 
management of the institution. Similarly, the business 
alignment stage in the proposed hybrid model argues the 
importance of setting the objective that is articulated in four 
main activities which are the development of information 
security risk management and information classification 
policy, scope of risk assessment and protection measures, 
monitoring and communication strategy. 
 
B.  Scope Statement  
The scope statement in the ITS Risk Management 
Framework Standard states the following: “It will apply to 
IT Infrastructure, Application and Service risk.” 
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This shows that the IT risk management policy is applicable 
to all assets in the infrastructure, applications and IT services 
provided to the stakeholders. 
 
C.  Asset Inventory  
The artifact that shows the list of services is named the 
Application Catalogue which shows a total of 112 services 
with sufficient information that captures the functionality of 
the service, the data owner and other information that is 
relevant to the institution in question. This approach 
resembles similar activities followed in the proposed hybrid 
model where the requirement of the asset profiling is 
identified to present sufficient information that supports the 
awareness of the service to the stakeholders and provide 
directions in analyzing the applicable vulnerabilities and 
threats. Similar the review service catalogue shows the 
criticality of the asset in terms of availability. It provides the 
opportunity to establish an institution-wide understanding of 
the service classification. 
 
D. Vulnerability and Threat Assessment  
The deployed vulnerability and threat assessment are 
combined using an automated query tool to identify the 
weakness in the computer network and relevant information 
asset. The realization of potential exploitation through the 
automated tool builds a repository of information that is 
subject to risk construction exercise. The proposed hybrid 
model shows importance of vulnerability and threat 
identification and analysis to establish a threat scenario that 
provides a direction to builds up the risk assessment phase. 
 
E. Risk Assessment  
The review of information security risk assessment is 
documented in the ITS Risk Register which contains three 
sections: risk identification, risk analysis, response planning and 
risk monitoring. Each section has multiple attributes. The 
description and content of the attributes were reviewed to 
establish the presence of the threat scenario as a result of 
vulnerabilities and threats analyzed at the previous stage. The 
content in the ITS Risk Register shows no identification of 
threat scenarios and associated risks or the impacted services. 
Instead, the information captured shows selected number of 
risks that are defined based on the risk surface only. Many of 
the reviewed standards, guides and methodologies throughout 
this research, discuss the importance of identifying assets and 
the relevant vulnerabilities and threats as part of the risk 
assessment process. This aids in the identification of more 
focused control implementation that is accurate and mitigates 
the risk identified. Finally, the ITS Risk Management 
Framework Standard fulfills the communication gap between 
bottom-up and top-bottom approach using a linkage between 
the ITS Risk Register and the enterprise risk assessment process 
as stated below: "Risk reporting and assessment is 
consolidated" 
 
The potential vulnerabilities and threats are not identified and 
assessed in a manner that makes the control selection and 
implementation specific to the potential risks. This causes 
disconnection in obtaining the appropriate endorsement from 
senior management of the institution to allocate the budgetary 
allowance to mitigate the security risks. 
8. CONCLUSION  
The proposed hybrid model in this paper allows other 
researchers in risk management to examine the applicability 
of the proposed hybrid model in organizations of different 
sizes and complexity of operations. More importantly, it 
builds the foundation for carrying our further studies in the 
aim of systematically addressing information security risks 
while examining the growing threat landscape as a 
fundamental process in the risk assessment cycle. 
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